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Transparency is a salutary value in South Africa (SA)’s constitutional 
architecture.[1] It has also been described as a necessary element in 
promoting accountability in essential medicines selection, quality 
assurance, improvement of use, and priority setting for research 
and development.[2] One of the institutions providing an important 
public function in every country is the national medicines regulatory 
authority (NMRA). In SA, this function is in the process of being 
transferred from the Medicines Control Council (MCC) to the SA 
Health Products Regulatory Authority (SAHPRA). However, despite 
amendments in 1997,[3] 2002,[4] 2008,[5] and 2015,[6] the Medicines 
and Related Substances Act No. 101 of 1965[7] (Medicines Act) retains 
a provision headed ‘Preservation of secrecy’ (section 34). This brief 
review seeks to evaluate section 34 of the Medicines Act in the 
context of transparency, and to ascertain whether it is in conflict with 
other legislation pertaining to the promotion of access to information 
and, in particular, whether it is consistent with the Constitution of 
the Republic of SA (the Constitution).[1] In order to establish the 
constitutionality of this provision, it is necessary to explore the 
following series of linked questions: 
 (i) What is the extent of the limitations on transparency in section 
34 of the Medicines Act?
 (ii) Is section 34 so excessively broad as to infringe on the 
constitutional right to access to information?
(iii) If so, can such an infringement be justified?
(iv) Does section 34 amount to an undue prohibition of access 
to information that is in the public interest, as envisioned in the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 (PAIA)?[8]
The Constitution
Any informed view of the statutory provision under scrutiny must 
consider the constitutional perspective. With regard to access to 
information, the relevant provision is section 32 of the Constitution,[1] 
which states: 
‘(1) Everyone has the right of access to – 
(a) any information held by the state; and 
 (b) any information that is held by another person and that is 
required for the exercise or protection of any rights.’
Given the supremacy of the Constitution, a provision in any law that 
is in conflict with it is unconstitutional, and therefore unlawful. The 
primacy of constitutional rights has been established in several court 
decisions. In S v Zuma,[9] these rights were given the most generous 
possible interpretation. The court made particular reference to the 
Canadian case of Regina v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,[10] in which it was 
stated: ‘The meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed by the 
Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a 
guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, in the light of the 
interests it was meant to protect.’  The constitutional perspective was 
further articulated in S v Makwanyane,[11] where the Constitutional 
Court emphasised a contextual approach to interpretation, which 
included reviewing the history and background of the Constitution, 
other provisions within it and the values it represents.
However, constitutional rights are not absolute, and in limited 
circumstances can be infringed upon, without invalidating the 
offending provision. This principle is specifically provided for in 
section 36 (the limitation of rights clause)[1] which states: 
 ‘(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms 
of law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including:
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’
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In view of the significance of rights and the protections they afford, 
if any provision appears to infringe upon a right it is prima facie 
unconstitutional, and therefore the duty rests on the infringing party 
to demonstrate that it has satisfied the test elaborated in section 
36, as stated in S v Makwanyane.[11] In making the determination 
of whether an infringement is justified, the Canadian court in R v 
Chaulk[12] set out the reasonable limit test following the case of R v 
Oakes,[13] which held that the objective of the infringement must be 
of sufficient importance, the means being used must be rationally 
connected to the objective, it should impair rights as minimally as 
possible and the effects of the limitation should be proportional 
to the objective. While South African constitutional jurisprudence 
shares many features with its Canadian counterpart, such as a two-
stage limitations analysis, it has not adopted the reasonable limit 
test, opting instead for a multifactor balancing approach. This confers 
a wide discretion on the courts, enabling them to sometimes adopt 
a test for rationality (deciding whether the limitation is reasonable) 
and, at other times, a test for reasonableness (considering rationality 
and proportionality).[14] 
Section 32 makes specific reference to information held by the state. 
In deciding whether the MCC or SAHPRA is an ‘organ of state’, recourse 
must be had to section 239[1] of the Constitution, which reads:
‘Organ of state’ means (a) any department of state or administration 
in the national, provincial or local sphere of government; or (b) any 
other functionary or institution: 
 (i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
 (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial 
officer.’
As institutions performing a public function in terms of legislation, 
namely the Medicines Act, both qualify as organs of state, and 
consequently are subject to the obligations placed on them by the 
Constitution and other legislation. In addition, SAHPRA has been 
designated as a schedule 3A national public entity in terms of the 
Public Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999.[15]
The Promotion of Access to Information 
Act
Section 32 is a key provision in the Constitution, as it has been 
held that access to information is crucial to the right of freedom of 
expression, and that the public must have access to information held 
by the state.[14] The right to access to information in section 32 of the 
Constitution is given effect to in section 9 of PAIA,[8] which deals with 
the objects of the Act: 
‘(a) to give effect to the constitutional right of access to 
(i) any information held by the state; and
 (ii) any information that is held by another person and that is 
required for the exercise or protection of any rights’.
PAIA is premised on the notion that access to information is essential 
to a liberal constitutional democracy, because transparency of state 
entities and public bodies promotes accountability and deters 
corruption and the abuse of power. For this reason, it endeavours to 
provide for access to any information held by the state, as opposed 
to access to information held by private bodies, which is limited 
to instances for the exercise and protection of any rights. This is 
reinforced by the strong and definitive wording of section 11 of 
PAIA,[8]  dealing with public bodies, which provides that: 
‘(1) a requester must be given access to a record of a public body if: 
 (a) that requester complies with all the procedural requirements in 
this Act relating to a request for access to that record; and
 (b) access to that record is not refused in terms of any ground for 
refusal contemplated in Chapter 4 of this Part.’ (emphasis added).
In certain instances, there is a justifiable interest in protecting 
information held by public bodies from being disclosed. Such 
instances are dealt with in Chapter 4 of Part 2 of PAIA, pertaining 
to the grounds of refusal of access to records, which prescribes the 
grounds both upon which an information officer of a public body 
must refuse, as well as instances where he may refuse, a request to 
access a record. Therefore, section 43 provides for the mandatory 
protection of the research information of a third party, and may 
require the protection of such information relating to a public body. 
These protections must, however, be weighed against section 46,[8] 
which deals with mandatory disclosure in the public interest, and 
which states: 
 ‘Despite any other provision of this Chapter, the information officer 
of a public body must grant a request for access to a record of the 
body contemplated in [various sections listed] if –
(a) the disclosure of the record would reveal evidence of – 
 (i) a substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with, the 
law; or
 (ii) an imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk; 
and
 (b) the public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly 
outweighs the harm contemplated in the provision in question.’ 
An NMRA is required, for instance, by Article 39 of the World Trade 
Organization’s agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights to protect undisclosed trial data against ‘unfair 
commercial use’, ‘except where necessary to protect the public’.[16] The 
decision in SA Airlink v Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency[17] 
illustrates the manner in which the courts have dealt with competing 
interests when considering the issue of access to information. The 
court held that, where a state body seeks to refuse access to 
information to the public, the burden rests on the person refusing 
access to establish that the refusal is justified under PAIA.[17] The court 
also considered refusal to grant access to information where doing 
so would be likely to cause harm to the commercial and financial 
interests of a third party. On this issue, the court held that in order 
for such a refusal to be justified the harm must not only be possible, 
but probable. In other words, it is not sufficient for a body to refuse to 
disclose information because there is some chance of harm to a third 
party, no matter how remote, as this would constitute an arbitrary 
infringement of a fundamental right. In order for state bodies to 
refuse to disclose information on the basis of a possible harm or 
setback to a third party, the duty is on the person refusing to show 
why this harm is serious and likely to materialise. The court also held 
that the mere existence of a confidentiality clause in an agreement 
‘cannot shield the agreement from disclosure’.[17] Furthermore, refusals 
cannot be justified by the mere fact that the requests made were too 
broad, as was held in the case of Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic 
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Resources and Others.[18] If the state body in question is of the opinion 
that a request is not sufficiently specific, it is under an obligation to 
assist the person who made the request in identifying the document 
or documents sought. It cannot simply dismiss requests and so deny 
a right to access to information on the grounds of ambiguity of the 
request, and there is a positive onus upon the state body to make a 
bona fide effort to clarify the information the requester is seeking, 
failing which the refusal will be unjustified. In this case, the court 
expressed a similar sentiment to that in the SA Airlink case regarding 
refusals. It stated that although confidentiality of information and 
potential violation of third parties’ rights are legitimate concerns, they 
cannot serve as grounds to bar access to all requested information.[18] 
Section 34 of the Medicines Act
Section 34 of the Medicines Act[7] provides that: 
‘No person shall, except for the purpose of the exercise of his 
powers or the performance of his functions under this Act, or for the 
purpose of legal proceedings under this Act, or when required to 
do so by any competent court or under any law, or with the written 
authority of the Director-General, disclose to any other person any 
information acquired by him in the exercise of his powers or the 
performance of his functions under this Act and relating to the 
business or affairs of any person, or use such information for self-gain 
or for the benefit of his employer.’
The wording in this section is peremptory, particularly the use of 
the word ‘shall’, and does not permit any disclosure of information 
except when specifically authorised by the Act. The purpose of 
this provision appears to be to prevent persons who work for and 
perform some function within the MCC (and now SAHPRA) from 
disclosing to unauthorised persons the information they gather in 
the course of their work, and from using such information for their 
own gain or profit. This, in itself, is perfectly rational, considering the 
sensitive nature of some of the information such persons might have 
access to, and for the risk of serious prejudice that such disclosure 
could cause to the persons and bodies to which the information 
pertains. The major concern for any NMRA is to protect information 
that is considered ‘commercial in confidence’, and therefore not to 
be revealed, on account of the potential damage to the commercial 
entity that has provided such information to the regulator for 
the purpose of obtaining registration of a medicine or medical 
device. In this regard, the recommendations of the US and European 
authorities on what should not be considered privileged information 
are instructive. Among the recommendations of the Blueprint for 
Transparency at the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are that 
the regulator routinely disclose basic information about the filing 
of applications for marketing authorisation, including for generic 
medicines, and the existence of clinical holds on clinical trials.[19] In 
particular, it is recommended that the FDA ‘[m]ake pooled data sets, 
masked and deidentified as appropriate, and the FDA’s analyses of 
these data sets, available to the medical and research community 
through clinical data repositories’.[19] Such analyses have traditionally 
been regarded as confidential, and not to be disclosed to any party 
other than the applicant for marketing authorisation. The European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) has noted the ‘growing demand from 
stakeholders for additional transparency, not only about the Agency’s 
deliberations and actions, but also about the clinical data on which 
regulatory decisions are based’.[20]
The reference to ‘self-gain’ and ‘benefit’ indicates that the legislature 
had contemplated that such information would have value to other 
parties such as competitors. The purpose of this provision is therefore 
to protect parties who submit sensitive and potentially valuable 
information to the NMRA when seeking regulatory approval from 
suffering prejudice through unauthorised disclosure. However, the 
provision appears to have overlooked the significant public-health 
interests that might be advanced by ensuring timely access to such 
information.
In enacting section 34 of the Medicines Act, it appears that the 
legislature intended to take a firm stance regarding unauthorised use 
of information. The provision is therefore drafted in broad terms to 
prevent any circumvention or liberal interpretations that would allow 
those who would breach this provision to escape the appropriate 
sanction. Section 34 appears to provide the MCC/SAHPRA with broad 
discretion to refuse access to information, with the exception of the 
limited grounds mentioned therein. Significantly, the MCC/SAHPRA 
is not required to provide any justification for its refusal to accede to 
any request for information. The temptation is therefore to apply this 
provision in a blanket manner, and opt not to place any information 
that is in the slightest part useful to a competitor, such as the fact that 
an application for registration has been lodged, in the public domain. 
Another default position is to fail to provide the scientific basis for 
regulatory decisions, including analyses and findings with regard 
to clinical evidence of safety and efficacy. Communication is often 
limited to the minimum information mandated by section 22 of the 
Medicines Act,[7]  and that required to be published in the register of 
medicines. There is a legitimate public interest in knowing whether 
an application for a particular medicine or medical device is being 
considered by the NMRA, as well as the detailed justification for either 
positive or negative decisions with regard to such an application.
A comparison of section 34 with similar 
provisions in other jurisdictions
The African Union Model Law on Medical 
Products Regulation
It is useful to compare section 34 of the Medicines Act with another, 
similar provision, article 34 of the African Union Model Law on 
Medical Products Regulation[21] (the Model Law), which states that: 
‘1) No person shall disclose to any other person or institution 
any information acquired by him in the exercise of his powers or 
the performance of his functions under this Law and relating to the 
business or affairs of any person, or use such information for self-gain 
or the benefit of his employer.
A person may be permitted to disclose information: 
 (a) for the purpose of the exercise of his powers or the performance 
of his functions under this law with the written authority of the 
agency/authority
 (b) when required to do so by any competent court or under any 
law, or
(c) if it is in the public interest.’ 
This provision, like section 34 of the Medicines Act, prohibits the 
unauthorised disclosure of information, but contains a few key 
distinctions. The first difference is the seemingly minor addition of 
‘or institution’ following the prohibition of unauthorised disclosure 
to any other person. The effect of this is to extend the reach of the 
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provision so that it applies not only to disclosure to persons but any 
other institution that may not fall into the category of natural or 
juristic persons. The most significant difference between these two 
provisions is contained in section 2(c) of article 34. This subsection 
incorporates a qualification to the refusal of access to information, 
and refers directly to the public interest. The effect of this is that 
unlike in section 34 of the Medicines Act, article 34 of the Model Law 
requires all refusals to be balanced against the public interest, similar 
to the provisions of section 46(d) of PAIA.[8] The implication of this 
provision is that there can be no refusal if disclosure is in the public 
interest, and consequently, that the refuser will have to satisfy this 
requirement. No such justification is required under section 34 of the 
Medicines Act.
Following its adoption by the African Union, member states are 
obliged to take steps to domesticate the Model Law by, for example, 
bringing domestic legislation in line with the principles entrenched 
in the Model Law.
European Medicines Agency transparency policy
The EMA has adopted a proactive approach to enhancing 
transparency by issuing a policy on publication of clinical data for 
medical products for human use.[20] The policy was designed primarily 
to promote access to information held by the medicines regulator 
through an online database that is publicly accessible. As stated 
in the policy: ‘The Agency is committed to continuously extend its 
approach to transparency and has, therefore, taken the initiative to 
develop a policy on publication of clinical data’.[20] The policy relates 
to clinical data, composed of clinical reports and individual patient 
data. Nonetheless, the policy provides for the appropriate protection 
of information it categorises as ‘commercially confidential information’, 
defined as ‘any information contained in the clinical reports submitted 
to the Agency by the applicant that is not in the public domain or 
publicly available, and where disclosure may undermine the legitimate 
economic interest of the applicant’.[20] Accordingly, such information 
is not published, and is redacted from published documents where 
necessary. Despite this approach, the policy has been challenged in the 
European courts,[22] and remains contested.[23]
The UK Freedom of Information Act
Section 1 of the UK Freedom of Information Act of 2000[23] states that: 
 ‘(1) Any person making a request for information to a public 
authority is entitled – 
 to be informed in writing by the public authority whether it holds 
information of the description specified in the request, and
if that is the case, to have that information communicated to him.’ 
In contrast to section 34 of the Medicines Act, this provision places 
emphasis on access to information. It makes mandatory the disclosure 
of information subject to a request to a public body, and requires the 
public body to state whether it has the relevant information. These 
requirements facilitate transparency in relation to information held 
by public bodies.
The US Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
Section 301(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) of 
1938,[24] the statute that regulates the US NMRA, the Food and Drug 
Agency (FDA), prohibits: 
 ‘The using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other 
than to the Secretary or officers or employees of the Department, 
or to the courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under 
this Act, any information acquired under authority of section 
404, 409, 412, 414, 505, 510, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 518, 519, 
520, 571, 572, 573, 704, 708, 721, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, or 
920(b) concerning any method or process which as a trade secret 
is entitled to protection; or the violating of section 408(i)(2) or any 
regulation issued under that section.’ 
This provision, similarly to section 34 of the Medicines Act, prohibits 
persons using information that they acquire as a consequence of 
their authority in the agency for their own advantage or any other 
unauthorised disclosure. Despite this, it does not act as a blanket 
prohibition on the disclosure of all information to third parties, but 
specifically refers to information that is entitled to protection under 
the Act as a trade secret. This would appear to allow for the disclosure 
of information where it would be in the public interest, provided it 
did not include such specifically protected information. Accordingly, 
although often heavily redacted, the FFDCA places considerable 
resources in the public domain, including detailed accounts of 
deliberations of the advisory committees that inform decisions of 
the FDA. Together with a wide range of stakeholder groups, the FDA 
adopted the Blueprint for Transparency at the FDA, and provides for 
greater transparency of information held by the regulator, as alluded 
to above.[19] In response to concerns about research-participant 
confidentiality, the blueprint calls for the following approach: ‘When 
clinical-trial data, including patient-level data, are not available to 
independent investigators through industry-sponsored websites, 
make data available through clinical-data repositories, with policies 
on deidentification to protect patient privacy.’
Analysis of authorities
Section 32 of the Constitution entrenches access to information 
as a fundamental right.[1] PAIA places great emphasis on access to 
information as a cornerstone of the transparency of state entities 
and public bodies.[8] The right to access to information, among 
others, seeks to make a clean break from the abuse of state power 
characterised by the apartheid system. This explains PAIA’s insistence 
on providing access to any information held by the state, as opposed 
to access to information held by private bodies. Given the gravity 
attached to the right of access to information in the context of 
public bodies, where such access is refused it must be for a specified 
and clear reason that is not outweighed by the ‘public interest’, as 
required by section 46.[8] Moreover, the refuser bears the onus of 
demonstrating that the refusal is justified under the law. 
Section 34 of the Medicines Act therefore appears to be in conflict 
with the values and rights entrenched in the Constitution and, more 
particularly, PAIA. This section, in effect, appears to grant the MCC/
SAHPRA unfettered authority to refuse access to information, except 
on limited grounds, based on its sole discretion. The limitation clause 
in the Constitution provides that any limitation of a right must be 
reasonable and justifiable. Applying the reasonable-limit test to section 
34, it is clear that, while limiting access to information where it would 
advance personal interests is relevant, and the decision to refuse access 
to information is rationally connected to the objective of prohibiting 
unauthorised access to information, the broadness of section 34 impairs 
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the right of access to information to a greater extent than is absolutely 
necessary and justifiable. Section 34 has its genesis in the predemocracy 
legislation, and clearly does not take into account the constitutional 
paradigm. Its effect is to deprive the public of access to key information 
that may be of benefit to society, and gives the MCC/SAHPRA unfettered 
discretion to deny such access without the requisite openness and 
transparency required by the Constitution. The restrictions placed on 
access to information are therefore disproportional to the interest of 
preventing harm to third parties.
The principle of constitutional validity of legislation was visited 
by the Constitutional Court in SANDU [SA National Defence 
Union] v Minister of Defence.[24] The court had to decide whether a 
provision prohibiting members of the national defence force from 
being members of trade unions was constitutional. In reaching 
its conclusion, the court set out the following test for examining 
whether or not a particular law is unconstitutional: 
‘The first question to be asked is whether the provision in question 
infringes the rights protected by the substantive clauses of the Bill of 
Rights. If it does, the next question that arises will be whether that 
infringement is justifiable. At the second stage of the Constitutional 
inquiry, the relevant questions are what is the purpose of the 
impugned provision, what is its effect on Constitutional rights and is 
the provision well-tailored to that purpose.’[24] 
The court held that the relevant provisions contained ‘a sweeping 
prohibition, whose consequence is a grave incursion on the 
fundamental rights of soldiers. The provisions cannot be justified by 
reference to the need to ensure that uniformed military personnel 
do not engage in politically partisan conduct’.[24] It held that the 
prohibition, despite being connected to a rational end (the need to 
ensure that uniformed military personnel do not engage in politically 
partisan conduct) was not sufficient to justify the infringement of 
their rights. The court accordingly found that the provisions were 
inconsistent with the Constitution.
Conclusion
Despite multiple opportunities having arisen to revise the law, 
section 34 of the Medicines Act, a provision that encroaches on 
a fundamental right entrenched in the Bill of Rights, without the 
requirement to provide any justification, remains in effect. In light 
of the emphasis on transparency and accountability in both the 
Constitution and PAIA, it is suggested that such a blanket provision 
barring access to information would not pass muster as a ‘limitation 
that is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom’.[1] It is accordingly 
submitted that section 34 of the Medicines Act is unconstitutional, 
to the extent that it violates the right to access to information in 
section 32 of the Constitution of SA, and should be amended in 
an appropriate manner to accommodate the fundamental right to 
access to information. 
It is therefore recommended that the following measures be 
implemented:
 (i) Section 34 should be amended to reflect the language and spirit 
of article 34 of the AU Model Law.
 (ii) This should be supplemented by the appropriate guidelines 
on commercially confidential information, as elaborated above, 
and the inclusion of a positive obligation on the MCC/SAHPRA 
to maximise transparency, while allowing applicants the right to 
motivate what should be considered as commercially confidential 
information.
 (iii) Finally, these legislative changes should ensure alignment 
with the provisions of PAIA and, in particular, the conditions and 
processes related to applications for access to information.
This is particularly important now that the 2008[5] and 2015 
Medicines Amendment Acts[6] have been promulgated,[25] and a new 
model of medicines regulation is being implemented. It provides 
an opportunity to redress a serious anomaly in our regulatory 
framework, and to align it with our constitutional paradigm, in order 
to reflect greater openness, transparency and accountability in our 
public institutions.
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